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Abstract. 
Although current studies into Chinese food supply and quality provide different 
explanations for the causality of food problems there is limited inquiry into the role of the 
county state. This is a serious omission because firstly county government performs a key 
role in providing support for farmers through agricultural extension services and farmers’ 
co-operatives; and secondly, the county level is central to novel instruments that seek to 
manage supply chain relationships, such as the implementation of food production 
standards. We investigate who are the key players involved in standard making and 
delivery at the county level. We also analyze how and why the local state engages in 
standard setting activities. We use Lin’an’s bamboo shoot production industry as a case 
study to understand how the local state implements hazard-free, green and mountain food 
production standards. The paper concludes that traditional conceptualisations of the local 
state do not sufficiently address how bamboo nature, knowledge of standards and state 
authority co-produce institutional capacity to control food supply and quality in China. 
By analysing the territorial strategies of a local state, we can identify the (re)production 
of nature; farmers’ co-operatives and standardisation as major territorial strategies to help 
Lin’an county enhance its institutional capacity. 
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摘要: 
 
在探讨中国食品供应和质量的文献中，多有涉及我国食品安全的问题，但是对于研
究县级政府如何管理和控制食品质量安全的文献却非常有限。本文指出研究县级政
府的食品管治角色是不可或缺的，因为一方面，县政府通过农业服务推广和农民专
业合作社来引导农民进行粮食生产; 另一方面，县政府以实施食品质量安全生产标
准作为新型的治理工具来控制食品生产质量。因此，本研究以县级为尺度来调查谁
是食品质量安生产标准的制订和执行者; 同时亦分析了县政府为何和如何参与食品
质量安全生产标准的制订。由此我们以临安竹笋生产行业为例，探讨当地县政府如
何实施无公害食品，绿色食品和森林食品的生产标准。相关结论显示: 传统的国家
理论未能充份解释地方政府如何有效融合竹笋资源，食品质量安全标准以及政府权
力来构建区域食品供应及质量安全治理体系。本文则透过区域策略的角度，分析地
方政府如何利用天然资源生产，农民专业合作社和食品生产标准来加强临安县於区
域上的食品供应和质量安全的治理能力。 
 
 
关键词: 中国地方政府，环境管治，食品质量安全生产标准，竹笋生产行业，临安县, 中国 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the market reforms of the late 1970s China’s economy and social structure 
have been transformed. Whilst understandably much attention has been given to 
industrialization and urbanization (Wu and You 2012; Siciliano 2012), the rural transition 
has also been profound. Rural enterprises have become integrated into global economic 
networks, which have, in turn, transformed domestic socio-economic landscapes and 
natural environments (Enticott, 2016; Long and Wood, 2011). An increasingly urbanised 
and affluent Chinese middle class is raising concerns about food quality and supply, 
ranging from milk powder contaminated with melamine, to recycled oil, and toxic 
chemical usage in the food production system (Chan, 2015). To address China’s food 
quality and supply dilemma, current debates mainly focus on four major themes. First, 
there are debates on how to resolve the tension between population pressure and resource 
scarcity. For example, China has to feed its 1.3 billion population and this huge food 
demand exerts pressure on food production, land capacity, and natural resource extraction 
(Boland, 2000; Smart and Smart, 2017; Smil, 1997). The rapid pace of agricultural land 
conversion in China has accentuated Lester Brown’s question, “Who will feed China?” in 
current debates over ambiguous land property rights and commodification of land which 
affect China’s food security (Brown, 1995; Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008; Yang and Li, 
2000). Second, land tenure problems affect food production quality. For instance, the 
average size of farmlands in southern parts of China is less than 2 acres; farmers who 
want to increase their incomes will apply a large amount of fertilisers and pesticides to 
their land to boost productivity, which causes severe soil contamination, and increases the 
likelihood of chemical remains in foods (Calvin et al., 2006). Additionally, the farmland 
household responsibility system mainly granted ‘use rights’ of land and not freehold to 
farmers. As a consequence, farmers may feel insecure about making a long-term 
investment on their lands but will engage in short-term profit maximisation activities (Lin, 
2009). Third, a national pro-growth agenda can encourage a relaxation of production 
standards in exchange for economic growth at local levels. Since food industries can 
provide a decent tax income for rural local governments (Ma and Ortolano, 2000) there is 
a policy intention to pay more attention to the number of food enterprises and less to the 
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monitoring and standardizing of food production (Bai, 2007). Fourth, studies 
contextualise the role of state-market dynamics to increase food production standards. 
For example, there are studies of how the local state and farmers negotiate on market 
prices, rules, and production standards in (1) ruminant markets such as beef and sheep 
meat, and dairy markets; and (2) cash crop markets such as grain and tobacco (Brown et 
al., 2002 & 2005; Delman, 2003; Longworth and Brown, 1995; Wang, 2009).  
Although current studies into food supply and quality provide different 
explanations for the causality of food problems there has so far been limited inquiry into 
the role of the county state. This is a serious omission because firstly county government 
performs a key role in providing support for farmers (e.g. agricultural extension services) 
and secondly, the county level is central to novel instruments that seek to manage supply 
chain relationships, such as the implementation of food production standards. We need to 
know more about who are the key players involved in standard making and delivery at 
the county level. We also need to understand how and why the local state engages in 
standard setting activities. To begin to investigate these topics, we use the County of 
Lin’an and its bamboo shoot production industry as a case study to understand how the 
local state implements hazard-free, green and forest food production standards. The 
growing importance of standards in public policy is an under-researched area (Brunsson 
et al., 2012), especially in China. 
A detailed analysis of standards in rural China is important for three reasons. First, 
it provides a lens through which to understand the dynamic relationships between the 
local state and market and how those are changing over time (Chung, 2004; Xiaoguang. 
and Heng 2008). From the perspective of the local state, the imperative is to increase its 
territorial reach so as to expand domestic and international markets for Lin’an’s bamboo 
shoots. A growth in the reach of the local state is however, constantly threatened by 
internal and external pressures. A key internal tension arises from the increased 
intensification of bamboo growing that has the potential to further exacerbate soil 
degradation. While an increasingly important external tension is consumer demand for 
higher food quality, which may be expressed in multiple ways, such as calls for better 
food safety or a desire for artisanal production. Second, the paper highlights the role of 
the county level in economic development and policy delivery. For Lin’an a bamboo food 
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standard has become a form of technical knowledge to serve the local state to extend its 
spatial control on bamboo shoot production. It acts as a spatial fix (e.g. to control 
fertilizer usage) to safeguard the quality of the material through the supply chain, from 
the rural bamboo grower to the urban consumers plate. A standard also shows a policy 
commitment to protecting the rural environment and promoting food quality (Bloomfield 
2012). Third, we show the extent to which standards matter in maintaining a competitive 
advantage for bamboo shoot growers in Lin’an, and thus why state and producer interests 
are so entangled. Standards are both a means and an end to secure a competitive 
advantage. In this way bamboo shoot standards become a territorial strategy for the state 
to manage nature since they can be used to establish growing practices and to publicly 
demonstrate how a resource can be utilized. In this way, we can show how international 
environmental neo-liberalism (Bernstein, 2001) interacts with Chinese governmentality 
(Jeffreys and Sigley 2009, 2014). One consequence is that bamboo standards can be 
conceived of as a means of putting a ‘green cloak’ over bamboo farmers and the local 
state. We use the term ‘green cloak’ rather than the more market-oriented ‘green wash’ 
because we wish to refer to a specific governance logic of state territorial control over the 
production of nature. By engaging with non-state actors including experts, academics, 
and producers to achieve greening efforts, the local state is able to develop a new set of 
production standards to legitimise an apparently ‘green’ productivist model. In this 
productivist model, Lin’an state uses bamboo shoot cultivation to achieve the 
environmentally-oriented directives of the National Forest Protection Programme (NTFP) 
and the Slope Land Conservation Scheme (SLCP) (Lin’an Forestry Bureau, 2009). Since 
the 1980s, the bamboo shoot cultivation area in Lin’an has increased rapidly; bamboo 
forest coverage grew 92% from 1985 (when it was 2,900 ha) to 2009 (when it was 
55,777ha). As a result of its efforts to increase bamboo growing, and so green the 
landscape, Lin’an state is nationally recognised as a China National Bamboo Homeland 
(Tang, 2007). When we lift the green cloak through detailed local analysis, however, the 
interest in standardization by farmers and the local state becomes more instrumental. 
There remains a deep-seated tension between exploitative ways of using resources and 
environmental limits, and these tensions are not fully-recognized at the local level. This 
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results in short-term economic gains mattering more than conservation for the local state 
and producers, and the exploitation of nature. 
This paper is divided into four further sections. In part two, we analyse how the 
local state and standards have become interwoven. We examine competing approaches to 
understanding the local state and how they inadequately conceptualise standards. In part 
three, we briefly explain our approach to data collection and the reasoning behind our 
selection of bamboo as a material and Lin’an as a county for research. Sections four and 
five report on our empirical material to show how Lin’an County implements hazard-free, 
green food and forest food production standards. In part five, we discuss the challenges to 
implementing standards in the bamboo shoot production industry. Finally, we reflect on 
the interaction between different levels of government and standard formation and 
delivery. We conclude that standards provide a valuable away to understand the 
dynamics of the local state and an important insight into multi-scalar activities. At the 
macro scale standards help Lin’an state to align with international requirement and 
increase its territorial reach to expand the global market for its bamboo shoot products. 
At the meso-scale, bamboo shoot standards help the State Forestry Administration (SFA) 
to compete with the Ministry of Agriculture to secure more financial resources from the 
Central State. Whilst at the micro scale, the local state engages with key actors, including 
farmers’ co-operatives, demonstration households and agricultural extension services to 
co-produce the knowledge of standards so as to extend its direct and indirect rules over 
bamboo shoot growers. This enables an ongoing remaking of the local state’s politico-
economic territory by expanding its spatial control over bamboo shoot production. 
 
2. Standards and the local state 
 
Commentators have pointed out that, standards are an often little noticed but 
nevertheless a remarkable feature of contemporary life (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; 
Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans and Epstein 2010). Creating a standard provides an 
important window through which to examine states or private actors’ authority to 
influence the quality and credibility of production and/or services (Cashore 2002;Damian 
and IIbery, 2006). (The nature of standards is discussed further below). Freidberg (2004), 
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for example, illustrates how the nexus of power-culture embedded in Western food 
standards becomes a new form of domination to demand notions of goodness and safety 
in imported food. Within the context of Chinese public policy there is a growing interest 
in food standards, principally arising from a series of high profile food scares (Liu et al., 
2013; Mol, 2014; Ortega et al., 2011). The work of Buckingham and her colleagues on 
bamboo standards (Buckingham et al., 2011; Buckingham et al., 2014; Buckingham and 
Jepson, 2013 &2014) has been particularly instructive as they have documented the ways 
in which national and international standards matter for biodiversity. Commentators in 
forest certification also comment on how the Chinese state tactically engages with non-
state actors (e.g. academics, forestry experts and producers) and third-party certification 
bodies (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council) to co-produce knowledge of standards 
(Bernstein, 2002, Cashore, 2002). This co-produced knowledge enables China’s food 
products to align themselves with global requirements whilst maintaining China’s ‘state-
centric’ governance system (Bloomfield, 2012, Hatanaka and Busch, 2008; Xiaoguang 
and Heng, 2008, Buckingham and Jepson 2013). 
Although current debates on food standards and forest certification provide 
insights into how the Chinese state collaborates with non-state actors so as to align with 
international requirements and maintain state-centric governance, most attention has been 
on national level activity. Researchers have paid less attention to the ways in which 
standards may matter at a local level (Yeh et al., 2015: 6), and of the role that the local 
state plays in mobilizing farmers to meet standards. It is important here to problematize 
the role of the local state: how might standards fit into local economic development 
activities? Why might a local state develop its own standards? How does the promotion 
of standards help us to understand the changing role of the local state? What process of 
negotiation takes place between actors at the local level in the delivery of bamboo shoot 
standards? More broadly, how does international neo-liberal governance and trade rules 
impact on an authoritarian domestic pattern of governance? 
To begin to answer these questions we seek to bring together the social, economic 
and political structures that enable bamboo shoot related-stakeholders to interact for the 
implementation of standardization policies and programmes (Lieberthal, 2003; Saich, 
2001). Coggins (2000) further suggests that scholars pay attention to the interactions 
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between the political economy of the bamboo forest and environmental degradation as this 
will affect the lives of rural people and biodiversity. In this perspective, there are networks 
among state officials, processors, forestry experts, technicians, research institutions and 
private agricultural companies, and bamboo shoot farmers who perform collaborative 
roles, define farming norms and negotiate standards for bamboo shoot production 
(Giddens, 1984; Sayer 1992). In our empirical material that follows, we detail how these 
arrangements work in practice for bamboo shoot growers in Lin’an. We argue that the 
county-state plays a crucial role in increasing farmers’ incentives and productivity 
through regulation and supporting policies (Brown et al., 2008; Longworth and Brown, 
1995, Rozelle, 1994, Oi 1992). To deliver governmental policies on food standards, 
agricultural extension systems (e.g. agro-forestry experts) and farmers’ co-operatives are 
important information providers that can diffuse knowledge and ideas of food safety 
(Sanders, 2006: 221; Waldron et al. 2006: 288). Even if such knowledge is not deemed 
appropriate by bamboo growers for their day-to-day activities, the tendency to comply 
with rules, regulations and standards prevails, or as Cartier (2015: 13) has described it, 
there is the “expectation of [a] uniform acceptance of authority.” 
The persistence of state authoritarianism, party-state governance and pro-growth 
pragmatism are central to interpreting current food systems in China (Cartier, 2015; Lee 
et al., 2012). There are two major ways to conceptualize the role of the local state in 
economic development. More specifically, for our perspective, it is important to 
understand how the local state makes plans, co-ordinates with different state and non-
state actors, and utilises the rights for fiscal autonomy to make profits from food 
production enterprises (Oi, 1992; Unger and Chan, 1999; Whiting, 2001). One 
perspective is promoted by Blecher and Shue (1996 and 2001) who employ the concept 
of a developmental state to analyse how a local state (county level government) plays 
direct and indirect roles to “plan, finance, and implement developmental projects” 
(Blecher, 1991: 268). The developmental state thesis argues that a strong central state 
creates favourable conditions for processes of economic restructuring in Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs) such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Both 
Blecher and Shue adopt the developmental state perspective to examine how a local state 
produces sympathetic economic conditions for the process of transition from a socialist to 
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a market economy (Alpermann, 2010, Howell, 2006). The role of the local state is to 
support the activities of companies as best it can, including identifying those companies 
or sectors which are most likely to be successful. The developmental state model is 
helpful in explaining why Lin’an County government will be so supportive of the 
bamboo shoots industry: it is economically and culturally significant. The model may 
also provide a tentative answer as to why a local state should be involved in delivering on 
national standards and promoting its own standard. This is because the Lin’an bamboo 
industry is already highly competitive and standards could help to protect its domestic 
markets from lower quality competitors and assist it in gaining access to international 
markets. A potential weakness in the argument is that there is little evidence to show that 
local producers and processors – the entrepreneurs who are to be supported – made any 
requests for standards to support or enhance their competitive position. 
A second perspective is that of the “entrepreneurial state” proposed by Jean Oi 
(1992) and Andrew Walder (1995). Both Oi and Walder understand a local state as acting 
like an entrepreneur. For instance, local state leaders perform the role of a board of 
directors in a company to make profits from Township Village Enterprises (TVEs), and 
sell land to maximise extra revenue for local government expenses and retain tax 
earnings (Li, 2009; Oi, 1992 and 1999). For Oi (1992: 100-01), “local government 
coordinates economic enterprises in its territories as if it were a diversified business 
corporation.” In contrast to the developmental state model which locates 
entrepreneurialism in the local business community here it is to be equally found in the 
local state because officials will wish to expand revenue-generating activities (Oi 1992: 
113), especially the “extraction of profits from enterprises” (Oi 1992: 118). To promote 
successful enterprises local governments can exercise control over factory management, 
offer privileged access to resources (e.g. raw materials), provide investment and credit 
and make available bureaucratic services (e.g. prizes) (Oi 1992: 118-22). The latter 
would also include certification and provide an important insight into why the 
entrepreneurial state would be interested in promoting standardization as it entangles 
state and nominally private interests as local party cadres; bureaucrats would be using a 
state supported instrument to endorse their firms to give them a competitive advantage. In 
this model, the local state will be innovating to provide support mechanisms to enable 
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firms to flourish. Oi’s work also distinguishes between entrepreneurially economically 
successful rural areas, such as Lin’an, and those that fall behind. Rather problematic, 
though, is how the model of the entrepreneurial state can bring together a sectoral – in 
this case bamboo – with a scalar perspective to suggest a geography of the local state that 
can offer an understanding of how nationally and locally formulated standards compete 
with or complement one another in specific places, such as Lin’an. How do state and 
private actors interact with one another in meeting or marginalizing bamboo standards? 
What do national standards mean to producers, processors and bureaucrats at the local 
level? And how might locally developed standards be scaled up from the county level to 
the provincial level? 
Part of the reason why both the developmental state and entrepreneurial state 
models fail to sufficiently incorporate the potential significance of a novel policy 
instrument, like a standard, is that they overemphasise state-driven transformation 
processes, which result in an unduly static understanding of state-market relations 
(Cartier, 2015). Instead, Cartier (2015: 22) explores how state power is shaped and 
reshaped in a dynamic way, in which the local state employs territorial strategies (e.g. 
direct investment, political negotiations, rearrangement of its administrative organization) 
to extend its governing capacity and authoritarian power. By adopting a more dynamic 
understanding of how a local state extends its control and rule on bamboo shoot standards 
through localised production networks we can analyse how a county-level state expands 
its direct and indirect rules through standardization processes. Here we can explore 
interactions with other rural areas. For instance, standards can be caught up in 
competition between rural areas, as local states seek to promote their bamboo shoot 
industries. Rural areas may also be engaged in exploitative relations with one another. 
For example, bamboo growers in the neighbouring county of Anji import bamboo 
supplies from elsewhere. These are then processed to maximize the value added from the 
cachet of the Anji name (Flynn, Chan, Zhu and Yu, 2017). We can also examine 
interactions with urban areas, because bamboo shoots are a material for urban consumers 
(see also Vandergeest and Uno 2012: 6). Standards provide one way of bringing together 
through a supply chain (from producer to consumer) knowledge and expectations of a 
product. Moreover, by exploring how standards operate in practice we can see how the 
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national state intrudes into a rural area, and also how a local state can seek to project 
itself beyond its rural area. For example, the county-level standard developed in Lin’an 
has a symbolism that spreads well beyond the community. At a time when changing 
administrative boundaries is commonplace, to extend or defend a rural economic space 
can be of paramount importance to local Party actors (Cartier 2015: 22). 
It is worthwhile explaining in a little more detail what is meant by a standard. 
According to Brunsson et al. (2012: 615) there are three characteristics of standards. First, 
a standard is a specific type of rule. “Standards reflect explicitly formulated and explicitly 
decided rules and thus differ from more implicit social norms. The rule-based character 
of standards makes them important tools for regulating individual as well as collective 
behaviour and achieving social order.” Second, standards are voluntary for those who 
wish to use them. In this sense, the decision to comply with a standard is one for those 
who wish to use the standard. This means that if a standard is to be effective it must be 
seen to be legitimate by those who use it and further accentuate the legitimacy of an 
action. Third, standards are meant to be widely used.  For those who formulate standards, 
the so-called standardisers, are looking to “provide rules for the many... They offer 
standards - which could be described as pieces of general advice offered to a large 
number of potential adopters” (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 2). Most standards are 
intended for use beyond the standardisation formulating body, for example, those relating 
to quality management which are developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). In short, standards “define normative rules. They prescribe what 
those who adopt these rules should do and hence enable and restrict behavior” (Brunsson 
et al. 2012: 616). Standards are often related to more privatised forms of governance. 
Market and non-market actors “rely increasingly on standards to manage reputations, 
make claims credible, and rationalise competition, especially when traditional forms of 
regulation (e.g. governmental) have been politically delegitimised” (Timmermans and 
Epstein 2010: 77). Standards have come to the fore in food and agricultural policy (see 
Busch 2000, Henson and Humphrey 2009) where corporate interests have a key role in 
securing food safety (Marsden et al. 2010). There are three major reasons to maintain 
food production standards: first, to ensure better quality and safety of foods (Trienekens 
and Auurbier, 2008; Wang et al., 2008); second, to increase small and medium sized food 
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producers’ incentives to comply with technological competencies, international standards, 
and food safety admittance systems (Bai et al., 2007); and third, to develop a new form of 
regulations and rule set that is both voluntary and involuntary. This is in order to achieve 
efficient management, quality assurance, promote environmentally friendly production 
and demonstrate social responsibility (Boström and Klintman, 2006: 165). 
Food regulations have been implemented to ensure food safety through a quality 
assurance approach from global to local contexts. At the global level, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) handle food safety issues in relation to food hygiene, 
pesticide usages, contaminations, and labelling (Luning et al., 2002). Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAPs), and Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCPs), are the 
most common food production standards in the international market. Entry to the WTO 
has been an important stimulus for Chinese policy makers and their thinking on standards 
because they need to ensure that domestic producers and manufacturers are not 
disadvantaged (see Buckingham et al., 2014). Much less remarked upon, though, has 
been the proliferation of standards following China’s market reforms, and whose 
introduction is only of limited relevance to compliance with world trade rules, for 
instance, because they are targeted at domestic production. For example, in relation to 
bamboo alone there are at least three national food standards (see Table 1). Moreover, 
standards have been formulated at both the national and local state level (see Table 1).  
The local (i.e. county) level is an important unit of analysis because national agro-
forestry policies are operated at this administrative level of government. The task, 
therefore, is to examine how county government collaborates with farmer’s co-operatives, 
producers, processors, and forestry experts to negotiate and produce bamboo shoot 
production standards. Our conceptual framework contributes to the understanding of how 
the role of the local state interacts with agro-forestry experts, farmers’ co-operatives, 
farmers, processors, and research institutions to construct particular concepts of standards. 
These standards involve cultivation experiences (e.g. mandatory training in fertilizer 
application and pest controls), taste expectations (freshness and texture), presentation (e.g. 
colour, size, and appearance); local artisan skills (equipment to dig up the shoots and 
skills to cut off the root parts) and local knowledge. 
  
 
13 
3. Research focus and methods 
 
Bamboo has enormous cultural significance in China. It is one of the four most 
admired plants (the others are the plum, orchid and chrysanthemum (Buckingham 
2009:4)). Economically, bamboo is also important. It is one of the fastest growing forest 
land uses in China – there are approximately 7 million hectare of bamboo forest – and the 
industry is estimated to be worth about US$5.4bn a year (Buckingham 2009: 4). In many 
ways bamboo has the features of a classic sustainable material: it is natural, grows rapidly 
and can do so with limited or no inputs, can be substituted for more environmentally 
damaging materials (such as plastics, fibers or woods) and can have limited waste. In 
addition, as a natural material, bamboo is biodegradable. Whilst these are features that 
can be attributed to bamboo, they may not necessarily hold true in local contexts. 
Moreover, bamboo can, like other materials, be the subject of scarcity which can promote 
ever more intensive production. As Buckingham (2009) has noted growing awareness of 
the environmental and social problems in bamboo forestry has stimulated interest in 
forest certification schemes such as that of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
The traditional markets for bamboo products are handicrafts, chopsticks and 
bamboo shoots (food). Emergent markets, with the greatest added value, include furniture 
and flooring. Here there is not only a domestic demand but also significant export 
markets. Our interest is in bamboo shoots as a food because thinking on standards most 
clearly brings together producers, processors and consumers. As we shall see in the 
following section, there are international, national and locally developed standards that 
apply to bamboo shoots. Lin’an County in Zhejiang1 province (see Figure 1) was selected 
as the geographical focus for the research on the standardization of bamboo shoots 
because of three major factors. First, it is well known for its bamboo knowledge and has a 
long history of bamboo shoot production, going back to the 15th century. Lin’an County 
is the biggest bamboo shoot production hub in China. Second, the local state uses 
bamboo shoot production as a means to provide ecological services (e.g. manage soil 
                                                 
1 Zhejiang province is the largest bamboo production area in China. It is located on the Eastern part of 
China, adjacent to Shanghai Province. The administrative hierarchy of Zhejiang province is apportioned 
into 11 prefecture-level cities, 32 districts, 22 county-level cities, 35 counties and 1 autonomous county. 
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erosion by encouraging bamboo planting, see below) and socio-economic functions (e.g. 
stabilise farmers’ livelihoods), which provides a lens to evaluate the steering approaches 
and policy implementation of production standards. Third, the bamboo shoot production 
industry is a crucial part of the mountain economy. In Lin’an County around 50% of 
farmer’s incomes is derived from bamboo shoots. Whilst more than 60 types of bamboo 
are grown within Lin’an County there are three major types of bamboo shoots: Moso 
(Phyllostachys Edulis), Phyllostachys (Ph.) Praecox, and Phyllostachys (Ph.) Nuda. The 
specialization on three types rests on decisions made during the 1980s by the Lin’an 
Forestry Bureau. It wished to encourage farmers to grow bamboo shoots based on 
different slope gradients. For instance, on slope gradients lower than 20°, farmers were 
encouraged to grow Ph. Praecox bamboo shoots; where the slope gradient was greater 
than 20°, farmers were encouraged to grow Ph. Nuda bamboo shoots (Lin’an Forestry 
Bureau, 1994, p. 27). In Lin’an, like the neighbouring county of Anji, the increasing 
specialization in bamboo growing has been accompanied by an increase in the area of 
bamboo forestland with a consequent loss of needle leaf and broadleaf forests (Xu et al 
2011). The tendency to promote the monoculture of bamboo has important implications 
for biodiversity (Coggins 2000). 
Owing to different seasonality, these three major shoot types provide fresh shoots 
for the wholesale market for a longer time period and also appeal to different users. Moso 
and Ph. Praecox shoots are sold in the fresh shoot market or processed into canned boiled 
shoots; while Ph. Nuda shoots become dried bamboo shoot products. In 2006, the 
bamboo shoots industry in Lin’an produced 35,000 tons of bamboo shoots and generated 
an economic value of around 160 million Yuan (Lin’an Forestry Bureau, 2006). There 
are around 5,000 traders involved in bamboo shoot transportation and marketing. They 
bring the fresh shoots to wholesalers in Changzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, Jiaxing, 
Shanoxing, Lingbo, Suzhou and Wuxi (Chan, 2015: 283). 
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Figure 1 Map showing the location of Lin’an County 
 
The population of Lin’an is 525,900. It is one of the most important bamboo shoot 
production areas in the Province. For instance, the agricultural population makes up 75% 
of the population; 60% of farmer households work in the bamboo production, processing 
and marketing sectors (Chan 2015). In 2008, the per capita net income of farmer 
households was 9,680 Yuan, by the standards of Chinese farmers a high income. 
Administratively Lin’an is divided into four districts; below them are 22 townships; and 
finally 662 administrative villages. 
Lin’an County covers an area of 3126.8km2. Forestland covers 86% of the land 
area. The total bamboo forest covers 67,000ha (Tang 2007: 1). With its large reserve of 
bamboo resources Lin’an is nationally recognised as a State Forest City and a China 
National Bamboo Homeland. Since the implementation of the Forestland Responsibility 
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System (FRS) in 1983, 66.8% of family plots (zhilushan) and responsibility hills 
(zerenshan) have been allocated to every farmer household (Chan 2015). Most of the 
bamboo farmers in Lin’an County work on individual plots. 
The empirical base for the analysis in this article has been collected and built up 
over a period of time using a range of secondary, including archival, and primary data 
collected through interviews and field visits to Lin’an. Empirical research was conducted 
in 2011 and 2012. During this time in-depth interviews were undertaken with Forestry 
Bureau officials, farmers’ co-operatives, processors, bamboo shoot farmers, forestry 
technicians and Zhejiang Agricultural and Forestry University researchers. The in-depth 
interviews were conducted across national, provincial and county levels of forestry 
officials to understand how standards are delivered and implemented from central to 
county level. Archival materials in relation to bamboo shoot production standards were 
obtained from the State Forestry Administration and the International Network for 
Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR) in Beijing, Lin’an Forestry Bureau, Zhejiang Agricultural 
and Forestry University (ZAFU), and the Lin’an Modern Technology Company in Lin’an 
County.  Data collection has also been carried out in the neighbouring county, Anji, also 
noted for its bamboo growing. We have visited firms and their leaders in the main 
economic sectors (including bamboo growers, process, traders) and had the opportunity 
to observe farmers and processors in action. We have also tested out the evidence and 
information given in policy and promotional secondary material with our informants. We 
have continued to follow policy updates and remain in touch with academics and officials. 
 
4.1 International and Chinese standards for bamboo shoot processing 
 
China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Like 
countries in the West caught up in the neo-liberal political economy, the demands of the 
international market have driven the Ministry of Agriculture to institutionalize and 
monitor the processing standards of food products (for examples of other forms of 
standards and certificates see Hatanaka and Busch 2008, Cashore 2002, and Bloomfield 
2012). According to Wang (2012), export-oriented processors have to fulfil food 
production standards in order to be in compliance with international food safety law. In 
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Lin’an, the Product Quality Monitoring Group (PQMG) in the Lin’an Bamboo Shoot 
Processing Association (LBSPA) monitor two major standards for bamboo shoot 
processing: (1) international standard for local-led processors to fulfil overseas market 
requirements, and (2) China’s standard for local-led processors and small local processors 
(see Table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1 Two Major Levels of Production Standards in Lin’an County 
Standards Market 
segments 
Institutional setting Segment of 
bamboo 
shoot 
product  
Production and 
processing 
standards 
International 
standard for 
overseas market 
Local-led 
processors 
 
- Export-oriented  
 
- Bamboo shoot 
products are 
exported to 
Japan, USA and 
Europe 
Boiled 
bamboo 
shoots 
HACCP, 
ISO9001,  
Codex 
Alimentarius 
Commission 
Standard, JAS  
China’s standard 
for internal market 
Local-led 
processors 
 
- Internal market 
 
- Large-scale 
production 
 
Boiled, 
dried, 
preserved 
and seasoned 
shoots 
 
HACCP, 
ISO9001  
 
 Small local 
processors 
- Internal market  
 
- Small scale 
production 
Boiled, 
dried, 
preserved 
and seasoned 
shoots 
Bamboo shoot 
production 
mainly to 
comply with 
AQSIQ system 
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4.2 International standard for local-led processors 
 
The JAS2, ISO3, HACCP and CODEX Alimentarius (food safety) standards are 
crucial for export-oriented processors to follow (see Table 1). In Lin’an, over 10 bamboo 
shoot processing firms have obtained HACCP certification and ISO9001 certification 
(Lin’an Forestry Bureau – China’s bamboo village report, 2006). HACCP is a systematic 
preventative approach to regulate and control chemical usage, biological and physical 
hazards in fresh bamboo shoots’ production and processing (Asia Green Agriculture 
Corporation, 2010: 14). The JAS standard requires bamboo shoot processors to be in 
compliance with production standards, processing procedures, import clearance, 
inspection certificates, containers and packaging (JETRO, 2011: 3-11). There are both 
Japanese and overseas accreditors who certify the JAS for bamboo shoot processors 
(JETRO, 2011: 10). To help local-led processors comply with the international standards, 
the Lin’an Forestry Bureau and the Lin’an Bamboo Shoots Processing Association link 
them up with hazard-free bamboo shoot producers.  
To understand the effectiveness with which the local state regulates processors to 
comply with both international and national production and processing standards, the 
chair of the Bamboo Shoot Processing Association drew an important distinction between 
markets:  
 
Mostly, the local-led processing firms can fulfil both national [e.g. hazard-free 
standards] and international standards [e.g. HACCP] because their products have 
to sell to international markets and they have a stricter food quality control and 
assurance system. For instance, the Japanese food quality is very strict; if the 
Japanese customer found a hair in any bamboo shoot products, the whole 
container has to shift back to China. For the internal market, monitoring is a 
problem because we cannot safeguard those small processors to comply with 
hygiene and chemical usages standards because most of the small processors are 
household-based. (Interview with bamboo shoot association chair, P02, 2012). 
                                                 
2 JAS refers to the Japanese Agricultural Standard. This standard represents those imported agro-forestry 
products which are monitored by the Japanese Government. These imported products are tested and 
checked to fulfil Japan’s production standard and quality. A JAS mark will be placed on packages if these 
products are graded by the Japanese Government. 
3 ISO refers to the International Organization for Standardization. It is an international standard-setting 
organization to promote industrial and commercial standards globally. For instance, ISO9001 certification 
is the criteria for quality management. 
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A hierarchy of regulatory practice is emerging. Those at the top are producing for 
and selling to international markets. These firms are supported in their efforts to comply 
with standards. Beneath them are those firms who can produce for a national market and 
meet national standards. Beneath these firms are smaller companies who are targeting 
domestic consumers, are falling outside of the standards, and beyond both the regulatory 
and supportive arrangements of the local state. As long as the small, unregulated 
processing firms stay out of the public gaze they do not undermine the reputation for 
quality of Lin’an County which depends on the high profile exporting companies. The 
County’s reputation for quality also, and even more significantly, depends upon its 
bamboo shoot growers, and it is their interaction with standards that we now examine.  
 
5.1 Bamboo shoot production standards 
 
In 2009 a Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress enacted the 
Republic of China’s Food Safety Law. To help implement the Law, there are number of 
further regulations and standards developed at sub-national level. For bamboo shoot 
growers in Lin’an three are particularly important: the Hazard-Free Production Standard 
(HFPS), the Green Food Production Standard (GFPS), and the Zhejiang Province Forest 
Food Production Base Standard (ZFFPBS) (see Table 2). The standards are set and 
evaluated in a complex manner with responsibilities falling to different government 
departments. The HFPS and GFPS are the responsibility of the Zhejiang Agricultural 
Department, and the ZFFPBS is issued by the State Forestry Administration Forestry 
Products Quality Inspection and Testing Centre (Hangzhou). The competition between 
departments is typical of Chinese bureaucracy (Lin, 2001: 12; Wu, 2015: 123)  
The HFPS requires that farmers meet the following criteria: (1) chemical 
fertilisers should be kept at safe levels; (2) the surrounding areas of the agro-forestry 
production lands should fulfil hazard free standards, and (3) the production procedures, 
processing, packaging, storage and transport should reach hazard-free agricultural 
product standards. The standard is not particularly onerous because according to a Lin’an 
Forestry Department (aligned to the Provincial government) technician “most of our 
farmers fulfil the hazard-free standards” (interview, ID: GO 02, 2012). 
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The Green Food Standard has higher demands on the use and remains of toxic 
chemical fertilisers. The local state is making considerable efforts to promote the Green 
Food Standard to distinguish Lin’an products in a competitive market place, but where 
fertilisers are embedded in local farming practice that is difficult. As the same official 
noted: “we are working hard to help farmers to realise the practices of green food 
production standards. This takes time and financial resources to propel the green food 
standards because the requirements are hard to reach in farmers’ current knowledge and 
financial resources” (interview, ID: GO 02, 2012). 
The Forest Food Production Base Standard (FFPBS) is popular in Zhejiang. To 
differentiate its standard from those of the provincial Agricultural Department (i.e. 
hazard-free and green food standards), the Zhejiang Provincial Forestry Department’s 
Forest Food Product Base Standard (ZFFPBS) pays more attention to forest biodiversity, 
forest coverage, forest structure, soil condition, air quality and water quality. By being 
able to demonstrate the legitimacy of the ZFFPBS amongst its users, Zhejiang has been 
able to ‘promote’ a provincial standard to the national level. The national level Forest 
Food Standard, like that for Zhejiang, stresses ‘forest sustainability’. However, the 
national level standard is more rigorous as it promotes ‘product branding’, and 
emphasises ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ production without using any artificial pesticides and 
fertilisers and where materials are traceable throughout the supply chain from place of 
production to plate of consumption. Such a stringent form of production is beyond the 
means of Lin’an bamboo shoot growers which is why the Province is so keen to 
legitimise its own standard. 
Like the Province of Zhejiang, the County of Lin’an has also proved to be 
innovative. Led by Lin’an forestry experts and technicians, who have considerable 
expertise in bamboo cultivation and processing, standards were developed based on the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s hazard-free production and Zhejiang Province’s non-
environmental pollution bamboo shoot (DB33/333/1-2001). In 2009, the Lin’an Forestry 
Bureau certified the Ph. Praecox Bamboo Shoots Soil Rehabilitation Standards 
(DB3301/T199-2011) (see Table 2). This production standard regulates the terminology 
of forestry management, pests and disease control for bamboo. The purpose of the 
standard is to encourage soil rehabilitation of the Ph. Praecox shoots in degraded soil. 
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However, county level standards are relatively loose and the certification, traceability, 
and period of validity of bamboo shoot products are ambiguous. As we shall see in the 
remainder of the section, the standards do little to challenge the increasing intensification 
of production and the environmental degradation that results. As Bloomfield (2012: 404) 
has noted, measures like standards tend to be popular because “they do no tackle tough 
issues”. 
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Table 2. National, provincial and county levels food standards for bamboo shoot growers 
Standard Hazard-free food Green food Forest Food  Zhejiang Province 
Forest Food 
Production Base 
Standard 
Ph. Praecox 
bamboo shoots 
soil rehabilitation 
standards  
Year established 2001 1990 2015 2007 2009 
Levels of governance National National National Provincial County 
 
Permits genetically 
modified organisms 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Permits synthetic 
fertiliser and pesticides 
 
Yes 
 
Yes (only some kinds of 
chemicals are permitted) 
 
 
No 
 
Yes (only some kinds 
of chemicals are 
permitted) 
 
Yes 
Residue testing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Certifiers and cost 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Centre for Agri-Food 
Quality and Safety: no 
certificate fee 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Centre for Agri-Food 
Quality and Safety: 
RMB 10, 000 
 
State Forestry 
Administration: China 
Eco Development 
Association: no 
certificate fee 
 
State Forestry 
Administration 
Forestry Products 
Quality Inspection and 
Testing Centre 
(Hangzhou): no 
certificate fee 
 
Lin’an Forestry Bureau 
 
Traceability 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Period of validity 
 
Three-years 
 
Three Years 
 
Three years 
 
Three Years 
 
N/A 
Adapted from Scott et al., 2014: 161, Specification of forest food certification ZLC 003, 2015: 1-20; Zhejiang Main Criterion of the Forest Food Production 
Standards, 2010: 1-20 
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5.2 From Provincial to Local level: implementing bamboo shoot production 
standards in Lin’an 
 
Fresh bamboo shoots are a local specialty of food production and one that is 
increasingly being utilised. For example, farmers and processors are making references to 
the specific geographical origin of their bamboo shoots in the ‘Tai Wu River’ and Tian 
Mu Mountain’ in Lin’an (see the example of the Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Co-operative 
below). Farmers cultivate their bamboo shoots with Tai Wu water under the Tian Mu 
Mountain and these images conjure up powerful cultural messages for urban consumers: 
a typical Chinese mountainous climate with clean water. Moreover, growers are 
associated with traditional artisan skills of cultivation, harvesting and processing that can 
be dated back to the Ming Dynasty (15th Century). Through farmers’ personal experience, 
a high quality dried bamboo shoot should be brown and slightly green in colour with a 
soft texture. Good quality dried bamboo shoots should be uniform in size and without 
odours and mould. All these specific geographical and socio-cultural contexts construct 
the “authentic, healthy traditional” (Ilbery and Kneasfsey, 2000: 217-218) bamboo shoot 
products from Lin’an. 
However, images of high quality products based upon traditional bamboo 
growing methods and harvesting techniques jar with the reality of intensive growing and 
threaten to undermine the distinctiveness of the Lin’an industry. Environmental 
degradation and potential risks to food quality now go hand-in-hand: 
 
Owing to applying massive amounts of chemical fertilisers, which increase the 
accumulation of potassium and phosphate in the soil. Forest degradation [is a risk] 
because of phosphate content level above the safety level. By increasing the scale 
of bamboo cultivation, this deteriorates and accelerates pest and disease problems. 
To tackle this problem, farmers apply more and more pesticides, even some 
prohibited pesticides (i.e. carborfuran), to tackle this problem, which induces a 
food safety problem (Interview with government official, G01, 2012).  
 
Recognising that a key economic activity could be potentially undermined Lin’an 
state actively intervened to promote more environmentally friendly bamboo shoot 
growing practices. There were four major activities. First, prohibiting the use and 
marketing of carbofuran in Lin’an County in 2000. Second, collecting soil samples to 
evaluate the contents of the sulphur, potassium, and phosphate in 60 bamboo shoot 
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cultivation plots in order to calculate the appropriate proportion of fertiliser contents. 
Fertiliser use and application is an important part of bamboo growing and is discussed 
further below. Third, drafting County level hazard-free production standards for bamboo 
shoot cultivation based on those devised at the provincial and national levels. Lin’an 
Forestry Bureau worked with the Bamboo Shoot Production and Processing Association, 
bamboo shoot producers, processors, and private technological extension firm, and 
research institutions (e.g.. Zhejiang Agricultural and Forestry University) to co-produce 
the standards for bamboo shoot production. Since 2000, six types of bamboo shoot 
production standards have been developed, including ‘pollution-free and four-season 
productive propagation technique’ (DB3301/ T180-2010), and ‘Ph. Praecox bamboo 
shoots soil rehabilitation and nutrients supplement technique (DB3301/ T199-2011)’. 
Fourth, providing training workshops, exhibitions, booklets, and television broadcastings 
for bamboo shoot producers to learn about hazard-free production standards (Bamboo 
information, 2001: 2-3). Below we explore how the local state works with its co-
operatives to promote compliance with standards for the competitive advantage of 
Lin’an’s bamboo shoot growers. 
 
5.2.1. The local state and farmers’ co-operatives 
 
Lin’an state extends its direct and indirect rules on promoting hazard-free production 
standards through collaboration with farmers’ co-operatives and demonstration 
households. For direct rules, both Lin’an state and Forestry Bureau have the authority to 
control the production of bamboo shoots and the activities of farmers’ co-operatives 
through the forest law and farmers’ co-operative law4. Additionally, the Forestry Bureau 
provides technology extension services and monitors the production quality of bamboo 
shoots from individual farmers and co-operatives. To do so, Lin’an Forestry Bureau 
established 50 testing points throughout the County to monitor the quality, heavy mental 
content, and chemical residue of bamboo shoot production to make sure that it met the 
                                                 
4The State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (SAFIC) based on 
the “Farmers’ Professional Co-operatives Legal Document”, 2006 appeal to individual farmers to initiate 
the establishment of the co-operatives. There are more than ten thousands farmers’ co-operatives in China. 
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hazard-free production standard. The County government and Forestry Bureau also need 
and use the co-operatives to increase the state’s influence on individual farmers’ practices. 
Through forming partnerships with fertilizer co-operatives, Lin’an Forestry Bureau 
can, on the one hand, trace the origin of the fertilizers and, on the other hand, can extend 
its indirect rule over farmers’ fertilizer usage and cultivation procedures by encouraging 
co-operative members to achieve food production standards. The co-operatives keep 
good relationships with farmers through various niche services such as soil testing and 
fertiliser matching, and increasing the market network of bamboo shoots. Informal 
governance structures such as trust, negotiation, and verbal agreements are common 
within a co-operative’s networks. Farmers’ co-operatives also sign bamboo shoot 
production contracts with individual farmers that protect prices, provide production 
training and workshops for farmers to maintain hazard-free and Zhejiang forest food 
production base Standards (see Figure 2). To further understand how farmers’ co-
operatives make trust and verbal agreements with bamboo shoot farmers to achieve 
hazard-free production standards, the Yi Wei Fertiliser and Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Co-
operatives will be discussed in the following section. 
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2. Processing  
Demand side: bamboo shoots Supply side: bamboo shoots 
1. Production 3. Market 
Figure 2 Lin’an state, farmers’ co-operatives and rules to meet hazard-free and Zhejiang forest food production base standards 
• Increase the quality and stabilise the quantity  
 
•  Selecting, washing, weighing, and packaging 
 
 
 
• Customers in Lin’an, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou demand 
hazard-free bamboo shoots 
 
• International buyers require higher 
regulations on food safety  
 
 
Lin’an state 
Farmers’ co-operative law 
Demonstration households 
Bamboo shoots’ co-operative Bamboo shoots’ fertiliser co-operative 
Forest law  
Lin’an Forestry Bureau 
Provide training & workshops to meet “Hazard-free 
Production standard” and “Zhejiang Forest Food 
Production Base Standard” in terms of seedlings, 
fertilisers and pesticides usages  
Monitoring the quality of 
production 
Co-operative members 
Key: 
 
The direct-rule of Lin’an state  
 
The indirect rule of Lin’an state  
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5.2.2.1 Yi Wei Fertilizer Co-operative 
 
The Yi Wei Fertilizer Co-operative was established in 2012, and processes fertilizers 
for bamboo shoots’ producers. Members who buy the co-operative’s fertilizers will 
obtain standardized quality fertilizer and training in its application. The co-operative is 
small with only 100 members. According to a director of the fertilizer co-operative, it 
provides three major functions: (1) soil testing and soil condition consultancy services, (2) 
manufacturing and wholesaling of tailor-made non-toxic fertilizers, and (3) facilitating 
the County Forestry’s Bureau’s technological extension services to promote fertilizer 
which meets the hazard-free and Zhejiang Forest Food Production Base Standards. The 
director explained: 
 
 Our co-operative conducts research on the optimum composition of chemical and 
organic substances in fertilizer to restore degraded soil and meet the hazard-free 
production standard… We collaborated with the Zhejiang Agricultural and 
Forestry University, Lin’an Forestry Bureau, and the Agricultural Bureau’s soil 
testing stations to learn from their techniques to test the soil and learn their 
knowledge to blend the appropriate proportion of chemical and organic substances 
(Interview with co-operative director C01, 2012). 
 
According to the same director, farmers repeat use of a fertilizer is based upon their 
experience. However, many farmers lack knowledge of the fertilizers that they use. As 
the director explained: 
 
Some fertilizers are counterfeit and even toxic. The source of the fertilizers is 
difficult to trace. However, if farmers purchased fertilizers from our co-operative, 
at least they could know where it came from…. We will let farmers try our 
products and let them realise the improvement of their plantations. Once farmers 
see bamboo become greener and healthier, they will come back to buy it 
(Interview with co-operative director C01, 2012). 
 
Quality assurance of a fertilizer is a prerequisite for being able to meet hazard-
free and Zhejiang forest food production based standards. For the co-operative, though, it 
is not only establishing a relationship of trust with farmers that matters, because as the 
director explained building close relationships with the Forestry Bureau would help to 
promote their fertilizers to Lin’an farmers:  
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I have been working in fertilizer manufacturing and networking with Lin’an 
forestry officials for more than five years. Now, I have earned the trust from the 
Bureau because my fertilizers increase farmers’ productivity and ameliorate the 
toxicity of the soil. Therefore, I could accompany the Bureau’s technicians to 
promote my fertilizers and develop business opportunities (Interview C01, 2012). 
 
The relationship between co-operative and state is portrayed as one of mutual 
benefit: the fertilizer’s co-operative needs the government’s endorsement and 
recommendations to promote its products in the market; the fertilizer co-operative helps 
Lin’an state to make its farmers competitive. There are also complementary roles 
between the fertilizer and bamboo shoot co-operatives because the fertilizer co-operative 
sells the fertilizers to the bamboo shoots’ co-operative. For the bamboo shoot co-
operative this means that it can safeguard the origin and quality of the fertilizers used by 
its members to ensure that they meet the hazard-free production standards. 
 
5.2.1.2. Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Co-operative 
 
In 2009 the Kao Yuen bamboo shoot co-operative was founded. It is a medium-
sized co-operative with around 1,300 bamboo shoot farmers’ members drawn from across 
Lin’an County. The members are responsible for about 7,500ha of bamboo land. The Kao 
Yuen co-operative also directly manages 225ha of land. The co-operative mainly buys 
bamboo shoots from its members which it then sells on their behalf under the brand name 
“Tai Wu Yuen Tau”, named after its location at the head of the Tai Wu Yuen River (see 
above). The co-operative has guided its members to adopt hazard-free and Zhejiang 
forest food production standards from seedling propagation, fertiliser use through to 
production processes. 
The co-operative has two techniques to fulfil the hazard-free and Zhejiang Forest 
Food Production Standards: Pollution-free and Four Season Productive Propagation 
Technique (DB3301/ T180-2010), and Ph. Praecox Bamboo Shoots Soil Rehabilitation 
and Nutrients Supplement Technique (DB3301/T199-2011). These tailor-made 
production techniques are used to meet the Hazard-Free Bamboo Shoot Production 
Standard (DB33/333.3-2006). In addition there are three other major ways that the co-
operative maintains the quality of its member’s bamboo shoots.  
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First, the bamboo shoot co-operative collaborates with the Yi Wei Fertilizer Co-
operative (see above) by recommending to its members that they use the approved 
fertilizers from the Yi Wei Fertilizer Co-operative. In return, the fertilizer co-operative 
provides free soil testing services for the Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Co-operative’s 
members. Second, according to a director of the Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Co-operative, 
there are written contracts with its members that are used to maintain the hazard-free and 
Zhejiang Forest Food Production Standards: 
 
Our bamboo shoots products have a brand name called “Taiwuyuen tau” and 
farmers sign a contract with the co-operative because we have standardization in 
production procedures, fertilisers and pesticide usages. Therefore, the size, weight, 
width, and quality of our bamboo shoot products are standardised (Interview with 
co-operative director, C02, 2012). 
 
Third, establishing linkages with demonstration households is another way for the 
co-operative to diffuse the knowledge and practices of production standards. For example, 
the co-operative will put a sign on a demonstration farm reading “Ph. Praecox Shoot 
Plantation” to signify that plots of land are using hazard-free production standards with 
the co-operative’s guidance. Also on the sign will be the name of the demonstration 
household, the types and descriptions of soil restoration and the technology adopted (see 
Figure 3). Farmers who are interested in ways to achieve hazard-free production 
standards can contact the demonstration households or the co-operative to receive a free 
consultation. According to one demonstration household: 
More than 100 farmers consulted me for my cultivation techniques, farming 
schedules, and types of fertilisers, which I am using. There are around 30 farmers 
closely tied with me. Whenever they have problems, they come to my house to 
have a chat with me” (Interview with demonstration household, DH: 02, 2012).  
 
The co-operative not only nurtured its own demonstration household farms to 
display its hazard-free production standards but also employed the networks of the 
demonstration households to promote their brands and attract interested farmers to join 
the bamboo shoot co-operative. Like the Yi Wei, the Kao Yuen Co-operatives is working 
at the interface between the state and farmers. As the local state seeks to safeguard the 
economic interests of its farmers it is increasingly turning towards the use of standards. 
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Standards become a way of differentiating Lin’an products from their competitors. 
Protection of producers depends upon the local state being able to reassure urban 
consumers of the quality of products which is where the co-operative are playing a 
prominent role because they help to ensure that the requirements of standards are met. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Sign showing the adoption of hazard-free and Zhejiang 
forest food production base standards 
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6 Conclusions  
 
The standardisation of bamboo shoot products offers a valuable opportunity to 
discuss the role of the county state and governance of the state territorial control on 
bamboo shoot growers and resources. Studying standards also helps us to better 
understand the domestic repercussions – at this local level - on Chinese socialist 
governmentality (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009, 2014) arising from interactions with a growth 
fixated global economy that is based on neo-liberal themes of trade, deregulation and a 
limited state. Standards, like other neo-liberal practices, such as auditing and certification 
(Power 2009), are becoming more important policy instruments and a means to provide 
reassurance on quality when trading takes place (Bloomfield 2012, Cashore 2002). To 
gain a better insight into what standards means for Chinese local environmental 
governance we note two points: even when they have a stated ecological purpose 
standards may not produce improvements in the quality of bamboo growing environment, 
and in the Chinese context the operation of standards is intertwined with the practices of 
the local state, a markedly different state of affairs from what may be found elsewhere 
(see, for example, Hatanaka and Busch 2008). These two points are discussed further 
below. 
Intensification of production can accelerate soil degradation and impair the 
carrying capacity of the land. For the local state, the increasing tensions between 
economic growth and exploitative resource practices raise an increasingly pronounced 
conflict. We share Calvin et al. (2006)’s and Lin (2009)’s views that both the local state 
and producers look for short-term economic gains instead of addressing a deep-seated 
contradiction between resource exploitation and environmental limits (for a similar case 
relating to aquaculture see Vandergeest and Uno 2012). Therefore, standardization is 
merely a short-term fix to ameliorate environmental degradation. Even if environmental 
degradation is accelerated, the local state’s politico-economic territory is remade. To 
describe this phenomenon we use the term ‘green cloak’ since it suggests a specific 
governance logic of state territorial control over the production of nature. The local state 
engages with non-state actors to achieve superficial environmental efforts, such as 
developing standards to throw a ‘green cloak’ over a continuing productivist model. A 
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‘green-cloak’ requires state officials, academics, auditing bodies, and experts to co-
produce knowledge, such as showing quantitative changes to land surfaces and the 
number of green infrastructure projects, along with a set of rules to legitimise these 
green-looking development models. 
Our case study also reveals how the nature of the Chinese local state means that it 
inextricably intertwined with both the organisation and operation of standards so making 
it significantly different from what is expected though perhaps not realised in liberal 
democracies (Hatanaka and Busch 2008). This is because standards and the production of 
nature are part of ‘territorial strategies’ (Cartier 2015). The local state expands its 
territory and maintains its privileged governance through being able to exercise power 
over the multiple layering of space; namely physical space over which it can seek to exert 
control over raw material supplies, economic space where it can enhance competitiveness 
through the supply chain, and political space in which it hope to obtain the attention of 
the central state to boost its profile and economic opportunities. To be able to achieve this 
outcome our research has shown how standardization engages with the local state, 
farmers’ co-operatives, forestry experts, bamboo shoot processors and extension services 
to co-produce the knowledge necessary to realise these economic and political ambitions. 
Our work also helps to better understand the dynamics of the local state. At the 
macro scale, standards help Lin’an state to align with international requirements and 
increase its territorial reach by participating in global markets for its bamboo shoot 
products. At the meso-scale, standards related to bamboo shoots help the State Forestry 
Administration (SFA) to compete with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to secure more 
financial resources from the Central State. In fact, the SFA drafted the Forest Food 
Standard based on the Agricultural department’s hazard-free and green food standards. 
The regulations of foods are based on the types of food products, which are regulated by 
different departments. As a result there is an overlapping of food monitoring and 
certification. For instance, the MOA not only monitors the quality of fresh vegetables and 
meat products but it also monitors the quality of fruit products. However, the Forest Food 
Standard insists that ‘forest’ related products include dry fruits, mountain fruits, bamboo 
shoots, edible fungi, and mountain vegetables. The competition between bureaucracies 
that takes place at national level is replicated in subnational government. At the local 
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level, where so much policy delivery takes place, administrative competition may mean 
that there is more attention given to securing the ‘legitimacy’ of a standard and less effort 
to how that standard might help with the delivery of public policy. As we saw in Table 2, 
national, provincial and county governments are involved in standard setting. One 
reading of the Table is that national level standards are delivered in a relatively 
straightforward manner by subnational government. In practice, it is a more complex and 
dynamic situation with upscaling and downscaling and territorial competition taking 
place. An upscaling of standards can help the local state to secure administrative 
resources, inward investment and sympathetic policies (Cartier, 2016). At a provincial 
level, the upscaling of the Zhejiang forest food standard into a national forest food 
standard, involves the transfer of power, creates the potential for economic benefits and 
the opportunity for promotion among government officials. At the same time, the 
upscaling and downscaling of standards is taking place in a context of interdepartmental 
politics (e.g. between the Agriculture and Forestry departments) and this is resulting in a 
proliferation of standards.  
Whilst, at the micro scale, our study goes beyond national-level analysis of food 
standards (e.g. Bai, 2007; Brown et al., 2002, 2005) by examining how a local state 
engages with key actors including farmers’ co-operatives, demonstration households and 
agricultural extension services to co-produce knowledge of, and about, standards. In our 
analysis of how standards are used in practice we can see how they come to control 
bamboo shoot quality – a productive norm – and so become a governing tool for the local 
state to extend its direct and indirect rule over bamboo shoot producers. For direct rules, 
Lin’an state has the authority to control the production of bamboo shoots and the 
activities of farmers’ co-operatives through the forest law and the farmer’s co-operative 
law. These are the traditional ways of operating of the Chinese state. In its indirect rule, 
the County government and Forestry Bureau work with the co-operatives, research 
institutions, and demonstration households to increase the state’s influence over 
individual farmers’ growing practices, and here standards matter. By utilizing direct and 
indirect rules, the local state can use control and co-operation in its linkages with farmers. 
At present compliance with standards is confined to a minority of bamboo shoot 
growers in Lin’an; that is those who are best able to provide premium products. Lin’an 
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state aims at dispersing standardized bamboo shoot cultivation to a larger number of its 
farmers by demonstrating the economic value of standard adoption in growing. The 
highly networked nature of the Lin’an bamboo growing community means that much 
learning is taking place via the co-operatives. The co-operatives become an agency to 
extend the arm of the local state to ensure the legitimacy of the standards it promotes and 
to raise the market recognition of Lin’an bamboo shoots. This should increase 
consumers’ confidence in Lin’an products which will, of course, also be of benefit to the 
bamboo shoot processors. As the local state generates additional economic value from 
bamboo shoot production and processing it will also enlarge its economic territory. One 
challenge for the local state will be that as standards become normalized, then the local 
state may become less interested in standards promotion and more of an auditor (Power 
1999) along the supply chain to ensure compliance with standards. How such neo-liberal 
tendencies can be managed within the Chinese model of governance also points to the 
ongoing importance of the study of standards as a window into the dynamic nature of 
relationships within the state and between the state and other actors. 
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